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VENDOR AND PURCHASER - FRAUD - NORTH DAKOTA'S CREATION OF
CAVEAT VENDOR
In the fall of 1981 the Zinkes listed their home for sale with a
local realtor.1 Shortly thereafter, the Holcombs viewed the Zinkes'
home with Nitschke, a real estate agent, while the Zinkes were
away.2 The Holcombs spent an hour walking through the home
and the lot but did not inspect the appliances, sewer system, or
water system. 3 The Zinkes made no representations concerning the
home; 4  however, Nitschke and another real estate agent
represented that as far as they knew, everything was in good
condition. 5 The Holcombs executed a purchase agreement and,
shortly after moving in, discovered numerous defects with the
water system, appliances, and sewer system. 6
Although the Holcombs ultimately corrected most of the
problems, 7 they gave the Zinkes notice of rescission of the purchase
agreement. 8 The Zinkes refused to rescind the contract. 9 The
1. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 509 (N.D. 1985). The Zinkes entered into a listing
agreement with Hometown Realty granting Hometown the exclusive right to sell the Zinkes' home.
Id. Hometown was represented by MarkJohnson andJolene Nitschke. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Brief for Appellees at 2-3, Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985). When the
Holcombs viewed the house, Mr. Zinke was out of town and Mrs. Zinke was intentionally absent at
Nitschke's request. Id. Nitschke informed Mrs. Zinke that it would be best if the sellers were not
home during the buyers' inspection of the home. Id.
5. 365 N.W.2d at 509. Jolene Nitschke and Mark Johnson, the owner of Hometown Realty,
stated to the Holcombs that the house was "almost new, in excellent shape, and that everything was
in good condition as far as they knew." Id.
6. Id. at 509-10. The Holcombs discovered that the water emitted a strange odor and that the
dishwasher, garbage disposal, television antenna, water softener, and kitchen heating system were
defective. Id. at 510. The sewer system backed up on several occasions and flooded the basement. Id.
The home also violated a zoning ordinance, but Johnson and Nitschke assured the Holcombs that
zoning commission would grant a variance. Id. at 509-10. A variance was not granted, Id. at 510 n.1.
7. Id. at 510. In addition to the installation of new sewer pipes and a drain field to remedy the
drainage problem, the Holcombs repaired or replaced the other defective appliances and systems. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Holcombs then brought suit for rescission of the contract in the
North Dakota District Court for the Southeast Judicial District.10
The court concluded that the Zinkes had committed fraud by
suppressing material facts" and that the realtors had made affirma-
tive misrepresentations concerning the home.' 2 The court granted
rescission, and set off the Holcombs' repair and replacement costs
against the use of the home. '3 The Zinkes appealed, but the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that, if a
seller of defective real property passively conceals a material fact of
which he knows or should know, and which is not reasonably
discoverable by the buyer, the seller has breached a duty of
disclosure and if he gains an advantage over the buyer to the
buyer's prejudice through this breach, he has committed
constructive fraud.' 4 Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.
1985).
Historically, the rule of caveat emptor 15 did not apply when
the seller made intentional misrepresentations or actively concealed
a defect; thus, courts could grant remedial relief to buyers of
defective real property. 16 On the other hand, caveat emptor has
10. Id.
11. Id. at 511. The district court concluded that the Zinkes knew of, but failed to disclose, the
various problems with the home. Id. at 512.
12. Id. at 510. The district court concluded that Johnson, Nitschke, and Hometown Realty had
made affirmative misrepresentations concerning the property's physical condition and its zoning
status. Id. Johnson, Nitschke, and Hometown Realty did not appeal the district court's judgment
ordering the return of the realtor's commission to the Zinkes. Id. at 509.
13. Id. at 510.
14. Id. at 510-13.
15. See Hamilton, Caveat Emptor, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 280 (1930).
Hamilton noted that the doctrine of caveat emptor developed in England during the Middle Ages.
Id. At that time, trading occurred between buyers and sellers who knew each other and the goods
they were trading. Id. Consequently, disputes concerning the goods sold were settled in a friendly
manner between the parties. Id. Because this informal dispute resolution system existed, no legal
safeguards were needed to protect the purchaser. Id.
16. See Diemert v. Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1980). In Diemert the plaintiff bought a
campsite from the defendant. Id. at 547. The seller knew prior to the sale that a billboard on the
premises was not in conformity with highway department standards and would have to be removed.
Id. After the purchasers discovered the problem with the billboard, they sought rescission of the
contract based on actual fraud. Id. At trial, conflicting evidence was presented as to whether the
seller made a positive misstatement. Id. at 548. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Diemert held
that fraud could be found without the existence of a positive false statement. Id. The court based
these findings on § 9-03-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, which defines actual fraud as follows:
Actual fraud within the meaning of this title consists in any of the following acts
committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive
another party thereto or to induce him to enter into the contract:
I. The suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to
be true;
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person
making it, of that which is not true though he believes it to be true;
3. The suppression of that which is true by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or
5. Any other act fitted to deceive.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-03-08 (1975). See also Fitzgerald v. Balkowitsch, 288 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1980).
In Fitzgerald the North Dakota Supreme Court found actual fraud where the vendor failed to disclose
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generally been applied to cases of mere nondisclosure or passive
concealment by the seller.'" Therefore, the doctrine prevented
recourse against a seller when a buyer purchased defective real
property under the latter set of circumstances.1 8
The general rules of caveat emptor have been slowly modified
by the courts' as changing circumstances have required. 19 At the
end of World War II demand for housing increased dramatically,
resulting in quickly built, poorly constructed housing. 20 To
overcome the injustice resulting from the application of caveat
emptor, 21 courts and legislatures created four exceptions to the
general rule of caveat emptor that there is no liability for mere
nondisclosure. 22 These exceptions create a duty of disclosure: (1)
when disclosure is needed to prevent a half-true statement from
being misleading; 23  (2) when disclosure of newly acquired
information is needed to prevent a prior statement from being
misleading; 24 (3) when one party, due to superior knowledge,
problems with the sewer system after being specifically questioned about it by the purchaser. Id. at
763.
17. See Peek v. Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 377 (H.L. 1873). In Peek Lord Cairns determined
that there was no actionable fraud for mere nondisclosure of material facts. Id. at 403. The term
"passive concealment" is synonymous with the term "mere nondisclosure" used by Lord Cairns in
the Peek opinion. Id. See also Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976), aff'd, 239
Ga. 31, 235 S.E.2d 532 (1977). The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that fraud by the seller can
occur in three ways: (1) positive misrepresentations by words or actions; (2) active concealment
where seller does not discuss the defect and takes steps to prevent the purchaser from discovering the
defect; and (3) passive concealment where the seller knows of the material defect and does not try to
hide the defect but "simply keeps his mouth shut." Id. at -, 232 S.E.2d at 142.
18. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv.
541 (1961). Bearman noted that prior to 1945, caveat emptor safely protected sellers from buyers'
claims of fraud because of mere nondisclosure. Id. at 561.
19. See id. at 542. Bearman noted that the doctrine of caveat emptor was limited in regard to the
sale of personal property before any such limitation was made regarding the sale of real property. Id.
Bearman noted that this distinction existed because mass production of personal property had
already occurred prior to 1945 while mass production methods in the building industry were not
developed until the end of World War II. Id.
20. Id. Bearman noted that it was inevitable that houses would be constructed poorly because of
the high demand for new homes. Id. The increase in demand for housing caused builders to compete
for raw materials, and once procured, to utilize them in building homes as quickly as possible. See id.
(citation omitted).
21. Id. at 542. Bearman noted that the increase in the number of defective homes being built
naturally led to an increase in the number of disgruntled homeowners who turned to the courts for
relief. Id. The development of implied warranties was one source of relief for the disgruntled
homeowners. Id. at 543.
22. See Keeton, Fraud - Concealment andNon-disclosure, 15 T x. L. RE'. 1 (1936). In examining
the changing application of caveat emptor in today's society, Keeton noted as follows:
The attitude of the courts toward non-disclosure is undergoing a change and
contrary to Lord Cairns' famous remark [in Peek v. Gurney] it would seem that the
object of the law in these cases should be to impose on parties to tie transaction a duty
to speak wheneverjustice, equity, and fair dealing demand it.
Id. at 31. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TotE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (5th cd. 1984) (liability
imposed for representation and nondisclosure); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976)
(liability imposed for nondisclosure).
23. See Smith v. Pope, 103 N.H. 555, 176 A.2d 321 (1961). In Smith the seller was held liable for
fraud when she inaccurately and incompletely described the quality of the well water. Id. at __
176 A.2d at 324.
24. See Morykwas v. McKnight, 37 Mich. App. 304, 194 N.W.2d 522 (1971). In Morykwas the
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knows of a fact basic to the transaction that is unknown to the other
party; 25 and (4) when the parties stand in a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. 
26
Many jurisdictions have utilized the first three exceptions to
the general rule of caveat emptor to require sellers to disclose latent
defects in real property if the defects are material facts that the
buyer cannot discover through a reasonable inspection. 27 In North
Dakota, breach of the duty to disclose under the first three
exceptions to the general rule of caveat emptor would result in
liability for actual fraud.
2 8
A few courts have not accepted the theory that the seller of a
home is liable for mere nondisclosure without the existence of a
fiduciary relationship 29 or the communication of a half-true
statement.30 These cases, however, have been criticized by both
seller was held liable for fraud for failing to disclose after-acquired information which made prior
statements to the buyer misleading. Id. at __ ,194 N.W.2d at 523-24.
25. See Kunkle Water and Elec. Inc. v. City of Prescott, 347 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 1984). In Kunkle
Water and Elec. the water company was held liable for fraud for failure to disclose to the city the extent
of repairs needed for a water system. Id. at 653. The court determined that the extent of repairs
needed was not only a material fact, but also one which was known only by the water company. See
id. at 653-54.
26. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of the fiduciary or
confidential relationship theory as a basis for a determination of constructive fraud in the real estate
setting in North Dakota.
27. Courts in the following jurisdictions have determined that a vendor has a duty to disclose
mactrial facts known to him if such facts are undiscoverable through a purchaser's reasonable
inspection: California (Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, -. , 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)); Colorado (Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 447, 349 P.2d 366, 367
(1960)); Florida (Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344, 347-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); Illinois
(Posnerv. Davis, 76 111. App. 3d 638, 644, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137 (1979)); Iowa (Loghry v. Capel, 257
Iowa 285, 289, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1965)); Michigan (Williams v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, -,
141 N.W.2d 650, 656 (1966); NewJersey (Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, -, 317 A.2d 68,
74 (1974)); South Carolina (Lawson v. Citizens and S. Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, -, 193 S.E.2d
124, 128 (1972)); Texas (Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.
1979)); Washington (Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, __, 353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (1960));
West Virginia (Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 888 (W. Va. 1982)).
28. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08(3) (1975). Subsection 3 of§ 9-03-08 defines actual fraud as
follows:
Actual fraud within the meaing of this title consists in any of the following acts
committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive
another party thereto or to induce him to enter into the contract:
3. The suppression of that which is true by one having knowledge or belief of the
fact;
Id. It appears that a finding of actual fraud could occur under subsection 3 ifa party breached a duty
to disclose by: (1) failing to prevent a previous half-true statement from being misleading; (2) failing
to disclose newly acquired information to prevent a prior statement from being misleading; (3) failing
to disclose known facts basic to the transaction that are unknown to the other party. See id. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of North Dakota cases in which the court found
actual fraud in real estate transactions.
29. See Ray v. Montgomery, 399 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 1980). In Ray the seller failed to disclose to the
buyers that the home had suffered termite damage. Id. at 232. The court did not impose liability on
the seller and held there was no duty to disclose defects unless the buyer requested the information or
a confidential relationship existed. Id.
30. See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Sax. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942). In
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commentator3 1 and court. 32 In North Dakota, breach of the duty to
disclose in a fiduciary or confidential relationship under the fourth
exception to the general rule of caveat emptor results in liability for
constructive fraud.
33
The North Dakota Supreme Court examined a claim of
constructive fraud in a real estate transaction in Asleson v. West
Branch Land Co. 34  In Asleson, both the seller and realtor
unintentionally misrepresented the zoning status of a piece of
property in a Multiple Listing Service. 3" The court in Asleson noted
that constructive fraud is found most often when there has been a
breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 36 Despite the lack
of such a relationship, the court held that the seller and realtor had
violated North Dakota's constructive fraud statute by breaching
their duty to accurately represent the zoning status of the
property. 37 The court noted that a high degree of accuracy in the
description of the property is necessary so members of the Multiple
Listing Service may use the information without misrepresenting
the condition of the property. 3 8
The Montana Supreme Court interpreted a constructive fraud
statute identical to North Dakota's in Russell v. Russell.3 9 The
Montana Supreme Court used constructive fraud as a basis for
Swinton the seller failed to disclose to the buyer that the house was infested with termites. Id. at __
42 N.E.2d at 808. The court refused to impose liability for mere nondisclosure absent a half-true or a
liduciary relationship. See id.
31. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser described the cases
that prohibit liability for mere nondisclosure as "surely singularly unappetizing cases." Id. at 738.
32. See Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In Johnson the Third
District Court of Appeals imposed liability for mere nondisclosure and stated: "However, having
acknowledged this authority [from the Fourth District Court of Appeals], by which we are not bound
and which we feel represents an offensive view of societal duties and fails to embody the ideals which
the law should always strive to reflect, we choose not to follow it." Id. at 347-48.
33. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-03-09 (1975). Section 9-03-09 defines constructive fraud as
follows:
Constructive fraud consists:
1. In any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gains an
advantage to the person in fault or anyone claiming under him, by misleading
another to his prejudice or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; or
2. In any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent without
respect to actual fraud.
Id. See infra Notes 34-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that have applied
constructive fraud in analyzing real estate transactions.
34. 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981).
35. Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981). In Asleson the property
was advertised in the Multiple Listing Service list sheet as properly zoned fo 35 townhouses, when in
fact the property contained only 3.04 acres and was suitable for only 30 townhouses. Id. at 535.
36. Id at 539.
37. Id. at 539-43. The court in Asleson noted that under special circumstances constructive fraud
may exist in the absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Id. at 540. The court based the
duty to accurately list property upon the nature and purpose of the Multiple Listing Service. Id. at
538.
38. Id.
39. 152 Mont. 461, 452 P.2d 77 (1969); compare MONT. CODE ANN. S 28-2-406 (1985) with N.D.
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requiring the seller to disclose hidden defects in the property.40 In
Russell the state health department had warned the seller of a bar
and restaurant of a violation of sanitation regulations. 41 The seller
failed to inform the buyers of the state health department
warning.4 2 After the buyers began to operate the bar and
restaurant, the state health department informed the buyers that
licenses to operate the premises would not be issued until repairs
were made. 43 The buyers sued the seller for rescission, basing their
claim on fraud. 44 The court in Russell held that the seller had
committed constructive fraud, not actual fraud, by failing to inform
the buyers of the state health department warning. 45
With this expansion of constructive fraud to build on, the
North Dakota Supreme Court decided Holcomb v. Zinke.46 The
court determined that, before rescission of the contract could be
granted, the plaintiff had to prove the following: "(1) the
Holcombs' consent to enter into the contract was obtained through
fraud; 47  (2) the Holcombs exercised reasonable diligence in
CENT. CODE § 9-03-09 (1975). See infra note 45 for a discussion of the similarities between MONT.
CODE ANN. S 28-2-405 to -406 and N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 to -09.
40. Russell v. Russell, 152 Mont. 461,465-66, 452 P.2d 77, 79 (1969).
41. Id. at 464, 452 P.2d at 78. In Russell the state health department informed the seller that the
sewage system violated state regulations. Id. at 79.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 464, 452 P.2d at 79. The state health department informed the buyers that repairs to
the water system and sewer system were required before it would issue licenses to operate the bar and
restaurant. Id.
44. Id. at 463, 452 P.2d at 78. The buyers sued the seller for the return of their down payment,
claiming that the seller had made fraudulent misrepresentations and had concealed material facts. Id.
finding of constructive fraud, as opposed to actual fraud. Id. The court stated that "we do not think
the instant case was one of actual fraud. . . .We think, instead, it was concealment, more in the
nature of a constructive fraud." Id. Montana's actual fraud and constructive fraud statutes are
identical to North Dakota's. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-405 to -406 (1985) with N.D. CENT.
CODE S 9-03-08 to -09 (1975). In Russell the Montana court relied on the statutory language in the
Montana code that is paralled to section 9-03-09(2) of the North Dakota Century Code in reaching
its holding. See 152 Mont. at 465-66, 452 P.2d at 79. Compare Russell v. Russell, 152 Mont. 461, 452
P.2d 77 (1969) with Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1963). In.Lingsch the buyer alleged that the seller failed to inform the buyer that the building in
question had been condemned. Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, __, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201,
203 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The California Court of Appeals, after noting that the seller has a
duty to disclose material facts known to him but unknown to the buyer, held that the failure to
disclose the condemnation constituted actual fraud instead of constructive fraud. Id. at 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 204-05. The California statutes defining actual and constructive fraud are identical to North
Dakota's. Compare CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1572-1573 (West 1982) with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-03-08 to
-09 (1975).
46. 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
47. Id. at 510. Rescission of a contract based on fraud is governed by subsection I of § 9-09-02 of
the North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02(1) (1975).
Subsection 1 states as follows:
A party to a contract may rescind the same in the following cases only:
1. If the consent of the party rescinding or of any party jointly contracting with him was
given by mistake or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence
exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds or of any
other party to the contract jointly interested with such party;
Id. (emphasis added).
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rescinding promptly upon discovery of the fraud;48 and (3) the
Holcombs restored the status quo. "49 The court examined each of
these requirements in turn.
50
In determining whether the Holcombs' consent was obtained
by fraud, the court noted that the district court appeared to rely on
constructive fraud doctrines to support its memorandum
decision.51 Therefore, the court reviewed the case as if the district
court had found constructive fraud on the part of the Zinkes.1
2
Constructive fraud occurs when a person, without any
fraudulent intent, breaches a duty and thereby gains an advantage
by misleading another to his prejudice. 53 Because constructive
fraud cannot be found unless a duty has been breached, the court in
Holcomb began its analysis by stating that whether or not a duty
exists is a question of law. 54 The court then noted that the duty to
48. 365 N.W.2d at 510. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04 (1975) (general rules governing
rescission). Section 9-09-04 states as follows:
Rescission, when not effected by consent or pursuant to sections 9-08-08 and 9-08-09,
can be accomplished only by the use, on the part of the party rescinding, of reasonable
diligence to comply with the following rules:
I. He must rescind promptly upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind, if
he is free from duress, menace, undue influence, or disability and is aware of his
right to rescind; and
2. He must restore to the other party everything of value which he has received from him under
the contract or must offer to restore the same upon condition that such party shall
do likewise, unless the latter is unable or positively refuses to do so.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Robertson Co., Inc. v. Kenner, 311 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1981). In
Robertson the plaintiff hired the defendant to construct steel buildings to store sunflowers after
harvest. Id. at 196. The defendant worked on the project for almost a year but the buildings, which
could have been comleted in six days, were never completed. Id. at 198. The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff waived his right to rescind because of a lapse of time. Id. The court, however,
determined that the promptness of rescission is dependent upon the facts of each case and not
exclusively upon the lapse of time. Id.
49. 365 N.W.2d at 510. See supra note 48 discussing North Dakota's statutes governing
rescission. See also Blair v. Boulger, 358 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1984). In Blair the defendant purchased
rental property from the plaintiff. Id. The defendant gave the plaintiff a down payment with the
balance to be paid to the plaintiff in the form of rent credits at the rate of $100 per month. Id. The
defendant was also to pay interest on the unpaid principal and to provide insurance, heat, water, and
needed repairs. Id. The plaintiff demanded rescission but did not offer to restore the insurance
premiums and expense paid by the defendant, nor did the plaintiff offer to restore the $7,000 she
received in the form of rent credit. Id. at 523. The court held that the plaintiff's failure to offer
restoration of all that she had received under the contract precluded the court from granting
rescission. Id. at 524.
50. 365 N.W.2d at 511-13.
51. Id. at 511. The court in Holcomb noted that, although the trial court did not state the type of
fraud, the trial court did rely on Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981), as
authority in its memorandum opinion. 365 N.W.2d at 511. The court continued by pointing out that
the Asleson decision was based on constructive fraud. Id. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Asleson and constructive fraud.
52. 365 N.W.2d at 511. See also Brief of Appellees at 11-16, Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507
(N.D. 1985). The Holcombs urged that the Zinkes' suppression of material facts constituted actual
and constructive fraud. Id..
53. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-09 (1975). See supra note 33 for the text of North Dakota's
constructive fraud statute.
54. 365 N.W.2d at 511. The court cited Kirton v. Williams Elec. Coop., Inc., 265 N.W.2d 702
(N.D. 1978), for the proposition that the existence of a duty is a matter of law. 365 N.W.2d at 511.
See Kirton v. Williams Elec. Coop., Inc., 265 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1978). The existence of a duty as a
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disclose is generally based on a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. 55 The court stated that since such a relationship
between the Zinkes and Holcombs did not exist, "any duty of
disclosure must arise from other circumstances. "56
The court then discussed the historical use of caveat emptor as
a shield to prevent placing any duty upon the seller to disclose
information.5 7 The court noted that caveat emptor was appropriate
in the agrarian society in which it evolved, but the rule was
inappropriate in today's complex society. 58
After discarding caveat emptor, the court found the rationale
for a new duty to inform a buyer of facts basic to the transaction in
Liland v. Tweto. 59 In Liland the defendant fraudulently induced the
plaintiff to exchange his farm and personal property for the
defendant's shares of stock. 60 The North Dakota Supreme Court
stated in Liland that, while caveat emptor applies to arms length
transactions, it does not apply if the seller makes a false statement
of fact and the buyer does not know it is false. 61 In such a case, the
buyer has an implicit right to rely on the false statement. 61
matter of law is generally well accepted. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, § 37. The existence of
a duty is "entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules,
principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the court." Id.
at 236.
55. See 365 N.W.2d at 511. The court stated that the duty to disclose "may arise from a fiduciary
or other confidential relationship." Id. (emphasis added). The court cited Asleson v. West Branch
Land Co. 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981) in support of this proposition. 365 N.W.2d at 511. The
court in Asleson stated that "[c]onstructive fraud is most frequently found in a breach of duty arising
out of a fiduciary or a confidential relationship." 311 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud 5 2
(1943)). See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of constructive fraud arising
from a breach of duty.
56. 365 N.W.2d at 511.
57. Id. The court cited Peek v. Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & I. App. 377 (H.L. 1873), for the historical
rule that no liability exists for mere nondisclosure of material facts. 365 N.W.2d it 511. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text for a general historical discussion sf'caveat emptor.
58. 365 N.W.2d at 511 (quotingWilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, -, 232 S.E.2d 141, 143
(1976), aff'd, 293 Ga. 31, 235 S.E.2d 532 (1977)). In Wilhite the seller passively concealed the tict
that the sewer system in the home did not function properly. Wilhite, 140 Ga. App. at __, 232
S.E.2d at 142. The buyer sued the seller, who defended by claiming that cavcat emptor barred such
an action. Id. The court determined that the seller had committed fiaud by failing to disclose the
problem with the sewer system. Id. The court in Wilhite also recognized that buying simple farm
acreage is far different from the typical purchase of a modern homne witI all its mechanical
complexities. Id. at __, 232 S.E.2d at 142-43.
59. 19 N.D. 551, 125 N.W. 1032 (1910).
60. Liland v. Tweto, 19 N.D. 551, 564, 125 N.W. 1032, 1037 (1950). The defendant
represented that the shares of stock exchanged for the plaintiff's property were worth more than their
actual value. Id. at 555, 125 N.W. at 1033. The defendant also represented that the corporation was
prosperous when in fact it was not. Id.
61. Id. at 567, 125 N.W. at 1039.
62. Id. The Liland court also stated as follows:
There is nopositive duty in the vendor to disclose defects in the article, but if he conceals
them, even by silence, where he knows the other party has fallen into a delusion in
regard to them, and is making a purchase which he otherwise would not make, or at a
price materially beyond what he would otherwise pay, in consequence of such
delusion, this is equivalent to a false representation or to the use of artifice to disguise
the defect of the article.
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The court in Holcomb elaborated upon the conclusion in Liland,
stating that "[s]ilence may be as misleading as a positive
misrepresentation of [a] fact, '"63 and as such, fraud may occur
without actually making a false statement. 64 The court then noted
that if a party is bound by good faith to disclose a material fact,
suppression of that fact is equal to a false representation. 
65
The court concluded that, despite the lack of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, when a seller passively conceals material
defects in real property of which he knows or should know, and
which are not reasonably discoverable by the buyer, he has
breached his duty to disclose and has committed constructive fraud
if he gains an advantage over the buyer through this breach.6 6 The
court reasoned that the relationship between the buyer and seller,
although not fiduciary or confidential, is marked by the seller's
superior knowledge of the property. 67 This possession of superior
knowledge creates the duty to disclose.
68
The Zinkes argued that they, as sellers, should not be liable for
failure to disclose facts unknown to them. 69 In discussing this issue,
the court noted that the district court found the Zinkes were aware
that the sewer system was defective and that the water had an
odor.70 The court noted that the trial record supported a finding
Id. at 569, 125 N.W. at 1039 (emphasis added) (quoting Paddock v. Strowbridge, 29 Vt. 470
(1857)).
63. 365 N.W.2d at 511. The court in Holcomb reasoned that since a positive misrepresentation,
which was at issue in Liland, could be as misleading as silence, the Liland court's analysis could be
applied to the situation at bar. Id. at 512. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text discussing the
Lilandcourt's finding of actual fraud based on positive misrepresentations.
64. 365 N.W.2d at 512.
65. Id.
66. 365 N.W.2d at 511-13. In support of its holding, the court cites the following cases, all of
which have declared a duty to disclose latent defects: Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, __ ,
29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (Cal. Dist. Ct, App. 1963) (breach of duty by seller to disclose known
material latent defects results in actual fraud); Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, -, 232 S.E.2d
141, 143 (1976), aff'd, 239 Ga. 31, -, 235 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1977) (suppression of known material
latent defects results in fraud); Posner v. Davis, 76 Ill. App. 3d 638, 643-44, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (breach of duty by seller to disclose known material latent defects results in fraud);
Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 657-58 (Tex. 1979) (breach ofa duty
by seller to disclose known material defects results in fraud). 365 N.W.2d at 512.
The court cited Hauck v. Samus, 212 Neb. 25, 321 N.W.2d 68 (1982) for support of its holding.
Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d at 512. In Hauck the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that a seller's
breach of the duty to disclose material defects of which the seller knows or should know results in
what would be actual fraud in North Dakota. See 212 Neb. at 27-28, 321 N.W.2d at 69-70. Compare
Hauck with contra Williams v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141 N.W.2d 650 (1966). In Williams the court
imposed a duty to disclose known defects by stating that "[k]nowledge of the prior defect on the part
of the vendor, of course is essential, for we do not intend to impose liability where no knowledge has
ever existed. Nor do we intend to make everyone an insurer of everything that is sold." Williams, 3
Mich. App. at -, 141 N.W.2d at 656.
67. 365 N.W.2d at 512. The court appears to reason that although constructive fraud usually
involves the breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, other circumstances, such as the
seller's superiority of knowledge, may also create a duty, a breach of which would be constructive
fraud. See id. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of fiduciary and
confidential relationships and constructive fraud.
68. See 365 N.W.2d 511-12.
69. Id. at 512.
70. Id. The court noted that at trial Mr. Zinke denied any problems with the sewer system. Id.
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that the defects in the sewer, water, and heating systems were
material and not reasonably discoverable. 71 Finally, the court
determined that the last elements of constructive fraud were present
because the Holcombs suffered a detriment while the Zinkes gained
an advantage by their breach of duty. 72 Thus, all the elements of
constructive fraud were established and the first proposition
necessary to grant rescission was proved. 
73
After the court determined that constructive fraud had been
established, it considered the last two propositions necessary for
recission. 74 The court determined that the Holcombs' notice of
rescission was timely, 75 and that the Holcombs had offered to
restore the status quo. 76 Because it found all the prerequisites to the
granting of rescission, the court affirmed the district court's
order. 77
The court in Holcomb explicitly created another exception to
the doctrine of caveat emptor. 78 Even though the Zinkes knew of
the defects, the court will apparently now hold sellers to a "should-
have-known" 79 negligence standard. The use of a negligence
Mr. Zinke had also testified that he had to pump the drain field every two weeks, and that on
occasion, the sewer would back up into the basement. Id. Mr. Zinke further testified that the water
did have a smell on occasion, but the smell did not bother him. Id.
71. Id. The court compared the material defects not reasonably discoverable in the Zinke home
to the defect found in the home sold in Fitzgerald v. Balkowitsch, 288 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1980). In
Fitzgerald the buyers specifically asked the sellers if they had any problems with the sewer system. 288
N.W.2d at 761. The sellers claimed they had never had a problem with the sewer system when, in
fact, there had been problems. Id. at 762. The buyers sued the sellers for fraud. Id. at 763. The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the condition of the sewer system, which the sellers
misrepresented, was a material fact, thereby supporting a finding of actual fraud. Id.
72. 365 N.W.2d at 513. The court determined that the Zinkes received more money for the
house than they would have had they disclosed its true condition. Id.
73. See id. See supra note 33 for the text of North Dakota Century Code 5 9-03-09 defining
constructive fraud. See supra note 47 for the text of North Dakota Century Code S 9-09-02(1)
providing for recission of a contract based on fraud.
74. 365 N.W.2d at 513. The remaining issues to be determined before the court could grant
recission were timeliness and restoration of the status quo. See id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04
(1975) (general provision governing rescission).
75. 365 N.W.2d at 513. See supra note 48 for the text of subsection 1 of 5 9-09-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which requires a rescinding party to rescind promptly. The Zinkes alleged
that there was a delay between the time the Holcombs discovered the defect and their attempted
rescission. 365 N.W.2d at 513. The court, however, determined that the alleged delay did not
prejudice the Zinkes. Id.
76. 365 N.W.2d at 513. See supra note 48 for the text of subsection 2 of S 9-09-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which requires that the rescinding party must restore, or offer to restore, the
status quo. In their offer to restore the status quo, the Holcomb's included the reasonable value for
the use of the home. 365 N.W.2d at 513. The Zinkes argued that the district court erred in offsetting
the reasonable rental value of the home against the Holcomb's cost to repair and replace the defects.
Id. Although the trial court's decision did not specifically state the reasonable rental value, it did find
that the reasonable rental value equaled the $5300 of costs incurred by the Holcombs. Id. at 513-14.
The court in Holcomb noted that, although it had remanded Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478
(N.D. 1980), for a determination of reasonable rental value, a remand of Holcomb would fly in the
face ofjudicial economy. 365 N.W.2d at 514.
77. 365 N.W.2d at 513. See supra notes 47-48 for the text of North Dakota's statutes governing
rescission.
78. 365 N.W.2d at 512. The court stated that its imposition of this duty constituted an exception
to the doctrine of caveat emptor. Id.
79. See Asleson, 311 N.W.2d 533 (constructive fraud found where seller and realtor
unintentionally misrepresented zoning status of property).
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standard is reflected in the court's holding which requires the seller
to disclose defects he should know exist in the home, and is based
on constructive fraud, which does not require fraudulent intent.8 0
Thus, a seller in North Dakota must not be negligent in discovering
defects or disclosing those defects to the buyer."' To remain silent
and still avoid liability, he must further determine what is
discoverable by the buyers' exercise of ordinary care and diligence.
If the defect is discoverable by the buyer, the seller would be under
no duty to disclose. 2
As a result of the holding in Holcomb, an increase in litigation
could occur.8 3 Angry buyers who have purchased homes with
80. See 365 N.W.2d at 512; N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-03-09 (1975). See supra note 33 for the text of
North Dakota's constructive fraud statute.
81. Compare Asleson, 311 N.W.2d 533 (constructive fraud found where seller and realtor
unintentionally misrepresented zoning status of property) with Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d 507
(constructive fraud exists when seller fails to disclose latent defects he knows or should know exist).
82. See Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d at 512. The court in Holcomb held:
that in cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective real property, there is an
exception to the rule of caveat emptor, applicable to this case, which imposes a duty on
the seller to disclose material facts which are known or should be known to the seller
and which would not be discoverable by the buyer's exercise of ordinary care and diligence.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. See id. It appears that a disgruntled buyer of defective real property has two options: sue
under actual fraud or sue under constructive fraud. Compare Diemert v. Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 546
(N.D. 1980) (claim for relief against seller who commits actual fraud) with Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d 507
(claim for relief against seller who commits constructive fraud).
To bring suit alleging actual fraud under S 9-03-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, the
buyer could allege that the seller suppressed a material defect, which he knew existed, in order to
induce the buyer to enter into the contract. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1975). See supra note 16
for text of § 9-03-08 of the North Dakota Century Code. Conceivably, the buyer could receive
punitive damages in such an action. See Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1981). In
Powers the sellers failed to disclose known latent defects in the 12-plex they sold to the buyer. Id. at
723. After discovering the defects, the buyer sued the sellers for actual fraud and was awarded
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The court in Powers upheld the punitive damages award
and noted that punitive damages could only be assessed in accordance with § 32-02-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id. at 728. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1985). Section 32-03-07
provides as follows:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
court or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Id. The court also stated that the seller's duty not to make fraudulent representations to the buyer
arose from law, not contract. 313 N.W.2d at 728.
The second option is for the buyer to sue under a theory of constructive fraud. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-03-09 (1975). See supra note 33 for the text of § 9-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code.
This second option will most likely be used when the buyer cannot prove that the seller intended to
commit a fraudulent act. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1975) (intent required for actual
fraud) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-09 (1975) (no intent required for constructive fraud). By suing
under constructive fraud, however, the buyer is precluded from receiving punitive damages. See
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, S 2 (punitive damages can be awarded when the defendant's
actions are outrageous, deliberate, or intentional as opposed to negligent).
The guantum of evidence necessary to prove the Holcomb negligence standard in a constructive
fraud claim would apparently be less than that needed to prove the intent requirement in an actual
fraud claim. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, 5 8. In discussing intent Prosser states as follows:
The factfinder need not credit the actor's assertion that the actor did not intend the
result in question. One of the common lines of argument against crediting the actor's
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passively concealed defects will now have a claim for relief.84
Further, it is conceivable that litigants could attempt to apply the
negligence standard in Holcomb to other transactions in which the
seller has superior knowledge of the goods being sold. 
85
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assertion is (1) that, given the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, a reasonable
person in the actor's position would have known that the consequence in question was
substantially certain to follow the act, (2) that the evidence shows that the actor was
even brighter and shrewder than most others, and (3) that the inference is therefore
compelling that the actor knew even though testifying otherwise. If the factfinder
credits inference (1) but not inferences (2) and (3), the finding is negligence. But if the
factfinder credits all three inferences, the finding is intent to produce the consequence
in question.
Id. at 36. Conceivably, the total number of fraud claims would increase even if the number of actual
fraud cases stays the same. See id.
84. See Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985). Buyers who cannot prove the elements
necessary for actual fraud may now use constructive fraud as another claim for relief. See id.
85. See id. at 512. In Holcomb the court's rationale for imposing the duty to disclose was that
there is a "clearly superior position of the seller vis-a-vis knowledge of the condition of the property
being sold." Id.
